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BANKS AND BANKINGSPECIAL AND GENERAL DEPOSITSGlass v. Nebraska State Bank' (Neb. 1963).
According to the testimony of defendant bank's teller, prior
to the plaintiff's deposit, plaintiff and C, the maker of the deposited check, asked if an escrow account could be opened to
cover the check of another party, D. After being informed that
such an account was possible, plaintiff and C told the teller that
they would make such a deposit. When the checks of D were
presented for payment, the teller, pursuant to instructions given
to him by the plaintiff, telephoned plaintiff to receive authorization to transfer plaintiff's deposit to the account of D. The teller
testified that he received the authorization and transferred the
funds. The plaintiff, however, denied all oral agreements with
the teller and claimed that he had made a general deposit. The
issue presented to the court was whether the deposit of the plaintiff
in the defendant bank was special or general. The court noted
that a deposit is presumed general unless evidence is introduced
to the contrary. Nevertheless, the defendant's evidence which
may have established a special deposit was not admitted. The
court said that a deposit slip signed by the depositor, the signature
card, the signature of the plaintiff on the card specifying only
one authorized signature for withdrawal, issuance of a general
account card, and crediting on the bank books of the deposit,
clearly constituted a written agreement and contract of general
deposit, not susceptible to any misinterpretation, ambiguity, or
indefiniteness. By invoking the parol evidence rule the evidence
of any oral agreements between the bank and the depositor was
2
barred.
If the court had found that the plaintiff's deposit was for a
special purpose, then the bank would have been the agent 3 of the
principal-depositor for the purpose of transferring the funds of
the plaintiff to D. The authorization of the depositor to transfer the
funds would have been embodied in the original agreement of

1 175 Neb. 673, 122 N.W.2d 882 (1963).
2It seems from the facts in Glass that the bank could have pleaded one

of two cases: (1) that the deposit was specific; (2) that there was a
subsequent oral authorization to transfer the funds. Judge Carter in
his concurring opinion points out, however, that the issue of subsequent
oral authorization was never pleaded-at least not on appeal. 175 Neb.
673, 688-89, 122 N.W.2d 882, 891 (1963).
3 See cases cited in note 23.

CASENOTES

deposit for a special purpose, and if the bank followed the instructions of the plaintiff and transferred the funds, the bank
would4 not have been liable to the plaintiff for misapplication of
funds.
In Glass, however, the court found that the deposit was a
general deposit creating the relation of debtor-creditor between
the bank and depositor.5 By virtue of the agreement creating a
general deposit, the bank could pay or transfer the funds on deposit only on the authorization of the depositor. 6 The defendant
bank could not prove that they had received any authorization
of the depositor to transfer the funds on deposit, and therefore,
the court held the bank liable for misapplication of funds.
SPECIAL AND GENERAL DEPOSITS

A. DEFINITIONS
Generally, deposits may be classified according to the interest
of the bank in the deposited funds. There are three classifications:
general, special and specific.
A general deposit is created by placing money in a bank to be
repaid on demand or to be drawn upon by the depositor. from
time to time in the usual course of banking business. Title to

the money passes to the bank creating a relation of debtor and
creditor,7 and such money mingled with the other money on deposit in the bank forms a general fund from which all depositors
4 See cases cited in note 24.

5See cases cited in note 7.
6A bank as debtor can only discharge its debt to the creditor-depositor
by paying the deposited funds back to the depositor when demanded
or by paying a third party who has been authorized to receive the
deposited funds by the depositor.
7 State v. Citizens State Bank, 124 Neb. 846, 854, 248 N.W. 388, 391 (1933):
"[W]here money is deposited as a general deposit, it ceases to be the
money of the depositor and becomes the money of the bank, and the
depositor becomes a creditor of the bank to the extent of such deposit."
Winchell v. Moffat County State Bank, 307 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1962);
Wichita Frozen Foods Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 190 Kan. 539, 376 P.2d
933 (1962); American Surety Co. v. Bank of Dawson, 39 S.W.2d 412

(Mo. Ct. App. 1931); Selig v. Wunderlich Contracting Co., 160 Neb. 215,
69 N.W.2d 861 (1955); State v. Platte Valley State Bank, 130 Neb. 222,
264 N.W. 421 (1936); Harrison State Bank v. First Natl Bank, 116 Neb.
456, 218 N.W. 92 (1928); Citizens State Bank of Petersburg v. Worden,
95 Neb. 53, 144 N.W. 1064 (1914); See also 5A MicmE, BANKS AND BANKING § 1 (1950).
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in the bank are paid.8 Also included under the classification of
general deposits are general deposits for a special purpose.9 This
type of deposit is merely a general deposit in which the bank
agrees to discharge its debt to the depositor in some manner designated by the depositor other than by paying the depositor on
demand, or honoring his checks in the regular course of business.
The understanding may be that the bank will pay a mortgage
of the depositor on the receipt of an instrument acknowledging
satisfaction of the mortgage by the mortgagee, or that it will
pay a note of the depositor when presented at the bank, or that
the bank will pay the water bill of the depositor. The title to the
money passes to the bank and the deposited funds are mingled
and used by the bank in its general business in the same manner
as a general deposit. 0
A special deposit is the transfer of money or property to a
bank with the mutual intention that the bank shall not own the
funds nor have the right to use them in its business." The bank

8Union Properties v. Baldwin Bros., 141 Ohio St. 303, 311, 47 N.E.2d 983,
988 (1943): "Title to the money passes from the depositor to the bank,
and such money, mingled with the other money, forms a general fund
from which depositors of the bank are paid." Rossman v. Blunt, 104
F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1939); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Board of Supervisors, 93 Cal. App. 2d 75, 208 P.2d 772 (1949); State v.
Farmers Bank of Page, 110 Neb. 676, 194 N.W. 865 (1923). See also 5A
MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 1 (1950).
9

Deposits § 70.3 (1942); 2 PATRON'S DIGEST, Deposits
§ 9:1 (1942). 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 530, at 3355-56 (2d ed. 1956): "The bank
may undertake, however, to apply the money deposited in some other
way than by honoring the checks of the depositor. The understanding
may be that the bank will pay a note of the depositor on the receipt
of an instrument acknowledging satisfaction of the mortgage by the
mortgagee, or that it will pay to the vendor of land the purchase price
on the receipt of a deed to the land, or that it will act as stakeholder
between the depositor and a third person and will pay whichever
ultimately proves to be entitled to the payment .... [Ilf the depositor
did not retain the beneficial interest in the money, but the bank was
entitled to treat the money as its own . . .such a deposit is a general
one although made for a special purpose. The relation is not quite the
same as that which arises in the case of the usual general deposit, but
it differs only in that the understanding is that money is to be paid out
for the purpose stated, rather than on the presentation of checks of the
depositor."
10 2 PATON'S DIGEST, Deposits § 9:1 (1942); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 530 (2d ed.
1956).
"Amos v. Baird, 96 Fla. 181, 185, 117 So. 90, 91 (1928): "Deposits by the
customers or clients of a commercial bank therewith are of two classes,
PATON'S DIGEST,
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becomes a bailee, trustee, or agent without title.12 Most jurisdictions, however, including Nebraska, impose a strict definition of
special deposit and make a further distinction between a special

deposit and a specific deposit.13

In its strict sense, a special deposit is defined as a delivery
of property, securities or money to a bank for the purpose of
keeping and returning the identical thing deposited to the depositor. The bank may not use the special deposit as its own, nor
mingle the funds with the other funds of the bank. 14 A bailor-

viz: special or specific, and general. When the identical money or other
thing deposited is to be restored or is given to the bank for some
specified and particular purpose, as to pay a certain note or other indebtedness, or is received by the bank as a collecting agent, such collection to be remitted, such deposits are special or specific, and the property
in the deposit remains in the depositor, the bank in such cases becomes
the bailee, trustee or agent for the depositor." See also 2 PATRON'S DIGEST,
Deposits § 9:1 (1942).

Amos v.Baird, 96 Fla. 181, 117 So. 90 (1928).
13 State v.Platte Valley State Bank, 130 Neb. 222, 264 N.W. 421, 423 (1936):
12

"Deposits of funds in a bank have various characteristics .... [A] deposit of funds in a bank to the credit of the depositor ordinarily is termed

a general deposit ....[Tihere is another class known as special deposits
....[Tihere is another class of deposits where the deposit is made for a
specific purpose . ..

."

See also Rossman v. Blunt, 104 F.2d 877 (6th

Cir. 1939); Officer v. Officer, 120 Iowa 389, 94 N.W. 947 (1903); In re
State Bank, 129 Neb. 506, 262 N.W. 15 (1935); Maurello v. Broadway
Bank & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 167, 176 Atl. 391 (1935). See also 1 MORSE,
BANKS AND BANKING §§ 189, 206, 288 (6th ed. 1929).
14 The older cases supported the view that the bank had no right to mingle

money or property deposited in a special deposit, and ifthe bank did
mingle the deposited funds with other funds of the bank, the money's
identity was thereby lost and the deposit became a general deposit.

Schulz v. Bank of Harrisonville, 246 S.W. 614, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923):
"In the case of a special deposit, the bank merely assumes charge and
custody of the property without authority to use it, and the depositor

isentitled to receive back the identical thing deposited. The title remains with the depositor, and, if the subject be money, the bank has no
right to mingle it with other funds." See also State v. Bickford, 28 N.D.
36, 147 N.W. 407 (1913).

However, the modern authorities are more liberal and hold that if
a special deposit of money ismade which becomes commingled with
the general funds of the bank, the special character of the deposit is
not destroyed by that fact alone. Fogg v. Tyler, 109 Me.109, 82 Atl. 1008
(1912); Busher v. Fulton, 128 Ohio St. 485, 191 N.E. 752 (1934); In re
Warren's Bank, 209 Wis. 121, 125, 244 N.W. 594, 595 (1932). "However,

the idea that the commingling of moneys with the funds of the bank
destroyed the character of the special deposit because the deposit
couldn't be identified was exploded .... [It was held that the general
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bailee relationship is created;' 5 and, if the bank fails to return
the identical thing deposited, or misapplies it in some manner, the

principles relating to trust funds should be applied, and so long as the
amount of money in the bank exceeded the amount of the deposit it
should be presumed that all moneys paid out by the bank were paid
out of its own and not out of trust funds." (Emphasis added). In re
Sturdivant Bank, 232 Mo. App. 55, 89 S.W.2d 89 (1936); In re Wellston
Trust Co., 136 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940). See also Annot., 82
A.L.R. 1-288 (1933).
There is a difference between the right of the bank to commingle
funds and the fact of commingling. Ellington v. Cantley, 300 S.W. 529
(Mo. Ct. App. 1929); Security Nat'l Bank Say. & Trust Co. v. Moberly,
340 Mo. 95, 102, 101 S.W.2d 33, 36 (1936): "Whether or not the bank in
fact commingles the deposit with its general funds and uses it as its
own is not determinative of the right or not of the depositor to claim
the deposit as a special deposit, but it is the right or not of the bank to
so commingle and use the deposit that is determinative. If when the
deposit is made there is an agreement, express or implied, that it shall
not be commingled with the other assets of the bank and used as its
own, but shall be kept intact as a separate deposit for a specific purpose,
this constitutes a special deposit, and the fact that the bank without
right commingles the deposit with its other assets and uses it as its own,
so that it cannot thereafter be traced and identified, does not defeat
the right of the depositor to have the amount of the deposit out of the
assets of the bank." See also Rossman v. Blunt, 104 F.2d 877 (6th Cir.
1939); Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 64 N.E. 292 (1902); American
Sur. Co. v. Normandy State Bank, 237 Mo. App. 39, 167 S.W.2d 436
(1943); In re Central Trust Co., 68 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
In re North Missouri Trust Co. of Mexico, 39 S.W. 2d 412 (Mo. Ct. App.
1931). See also 1 PATON'S DIGEST, Bankruptcy and Insolvency § 7D:3
(1940); 4 ScoTT, TRusTs § 530 (1956).
'5Busher v. Fulton, 128 Ohio St. 485, 489, 191 N.E. 752, 754 (1934). "A
special deposit is a deposit for safekeeping, to be returned intact on
demand-a naked bailment, the bank acquiring no property in the
thing deposited and deriving no benefit from its use. The title remains
in the depositor, who is the bailor and not a creditor of the bank." See
Richards v. Fulton, 75 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1935); Keyes v. Paducha &
I.R. Co., 61 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1932); Anderson v. Pacific Bank, 112 Cal.
598, 44 Pac. 1063 (1896); McCrory Stores v. Tunnicliffe, 104 Fla. 683, 140
So. 806 (1932); People v. Home State Bank, 338 Ill. 179, 170 N.E. 205
(1930); Ellington v. Contley, 300 S.W. 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927); Schulz v.
Bank of Harrisonville, 246 S.W. 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923); State ex rel.
Good v. Platte Valley State Bank, 130 Neb. 222, 264 N.W. 421 (1936);
In re State Bank, 129 Neb. 506, 262 N.W. 15 (1935); Maurello v. Broadway Bank & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 167, 176 Atl. 391 (1935); State v.
Bickford, 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407 (1913); Franklin Say. & Trust Co. v.
Clark, 283 Pa. 212, 129 Atl. 56 (1925). See also 1 MoRsE, BANKS AND
BANKING §§ 182-89 (6th ed. 1928); 5B MicmE, BANKS AND BANKING §§
330, 332 (1950).

CASENOTES
bank is then liable to the depositor under the general rules of
bailment. 16
A specific deposit1 7 is created when money or property is

delivered to a bank for some particular purpose, such as a note
for collection, 8 or money to pay some particular note or draft,19
20
debt to a third party, or certain checks drawn by the depositor.
A specific deposit is of the nature of a special deposit in that
title does not pass to the bank.21 But a bailor-bailee relationship
is not created. The majority of jurisdictions hold that a specific
deposit is of a trust nature, 22 and the relation between the depositor and the bank is one of principal and agent.23 The agentbank has the same rights and liabilities as any other agent. If

86 (2d ed. 1955). "The bailee . . . also
owes to the bailor the duty of redelivering to him the subject matter
of the bailment on demand, when the purposes of the bailment have

1; BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §

been fulfilled ....
If the bailee delivers the subject of the bailment to
a third person who is not authorized-by the bailor to receive it ... the

bailee is liable for a conversion of the goods or in damages for breach
of contract . ..

."

17 A specific deposit is also referred to as a deposit for a special purpose.
'8 In re State Bank, 129 Neb. 506, 262 N.W. 15 (1935).
19 Ibid.
20

State ex rel. Sorenson v. Bank of Otoe, 125 Neb. 530, 251 N.W. 111 (1933).
at 533. See also 1 MoRsE, BANKS AND BANKING § 185 (6th ed. 1928).
22
5B 1IcmE, BANKS AND BAN~rn § 337 (1950).
21 Id.
2

3 See also State ex rel. Good v. Platte Valley State Bank, 130 Neb. 222,

264 N.W. 421 (1936); State ex rel. Sorenson v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 125 Neb. 800, 252 N.W. 316 (1934); State ex Tel. Sorenson v. Bank
of Otoe, 125 Neb. 530, 251 N.W. 111 (1933). Bender v. Neisville Bank,
10 Wis. 2d 282, 285, 102 N.W.2d 744, 746 (1960): "It seems to be well
settled that a deposit made in a bank for a specific purpose, and for
that alone, partakes of the nature of a special deposit, and does not
establish the relation of debtor and creditor between the depositor and
the bank, but establishes a fiduciary relation which is sometimes declared to be that of principal and agent, while some courts hold that a
trust relation is created." See also Engleman v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 98 Cal. App.2d 327, 219 P.2d 868 (Dist. Ct. App.
1950); American Sur. Co., v. Bank of Dawson, 43 Ga. App. 593, 159 S.E.
736 (1931); In re Warren's Bank, 209 Wis. 121, 244 N.W. 594 (1932).
Narrell v. First Nat'l Bank, 241 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951):
"Where the depositor and the bank agree, at the time the deposit is
made, that the money is to be used for a specific purpose, and for that
alone, the relationship of debtor and creditor between the bank and the
depositor is not created, the relationship between them being that of
principal and agent, the title to the deposit remaining in the depositor."
(Emphasis added). Hjelle v. Veigel, 169 Minn. 173, 210 N.W. 891 (1926);
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the agent exceeds his authority, he is liable to the principal for
any loss which the principal may thereby sustain.24 A minority
holds that a specific deposit creates the relation of trust between
the bank and depositor, and/or beneficiary.25 The bank in this
case is a trustee of the funds on deposit, and the rights and
liabilities of the bank as trustee are the same as any other
2
trustee.
In determining whether a deposit is general, special or specific, courts generally look to the agreement of deposit between
the bank and depositor. 27 When a general deposit is made, the
bank and depositor have agreed that the bank may use the funds

Maurello v. Broadway Bank & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 167, 176 Atl. 391
(1935); 5B Mrrcim, BANKS AND BANKING § 337 (1950); 2 MORSE, BANKS
AND BANKING § 567 (6th ed. 1928).
24
Bank of British North America v. Cooper, 137 U.S. 473, 479 (1890):
"Uniform recognition and enforcement of certain settled and clear
rules are important. Among them, few are more significant or more
essential than that in the relation of principal and agent strict compliance by the latter with the instructions of the former is an unvarying condition of exemption from liability. Loss from disregard thereof
must be borne by the agent, unless he establishes that the disregard
had no connection with the loss, and that it would certainly have followed whether instructions were obeyed or disregarded." See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 383, 402 (1957).
25
Rossman v. Blunt, 104 F.2d 877, 879 (6th Cir. 1939). In this case a
draft was deposited in a bank for the purpose of paying the purchase
price of certain real estate. The bank cashed the draft and used part
of the funds for another purpose. The court, in their opinion, stated
that there were three classes of deposits: general, special, and special
purpose. In the third class the amount constituted a trust fund. See
Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 64 N.E. 292 (1902); Wenzel v. People's State Bank, 270 Mich. 424, 259 N.W. 120 (1935); Hershey v. Northern
Trust Co., 342 Mo. 90, 112 S.W.2d 545 (1937); Morton v. Woolery, 48
N.D. 1132, 189 N.W. 232 (1922). See also 77 U. PA. L. REv., 280 (1928);
Comment, 2 So. CAL. L. REV. 64, 65 (1928); 27 HARV. L. REV. 190 (1913);
27 HARV. L. REV. 398 (1914).
2
GState ex Tel. Sorenson v. American State Bank, 126 Neb. 34, 252 N.W.
460 (1934). See also Annot., 24 A.L.R. 1111 (1923). RESTATEMENT (SECoND), TRUSTS

§ 226 (1959): "If by the terms of the trust it is the duty

of the trustee to pay or convey the trust property or any part thereof
to a beneficiary, he is liable if he pays or conveys to a person who is
neither the beneficiary nor one to whom the beneficiary or the court
has authorized him to make such payment or conveyance."
2
7 Diehl v. Johnson, 123 Neb. 699, 243 N.W. 901 (1932). Engleman v. Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 98 Cal. App. 2d 327, 330, 219 P.2d
868, 870 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950): "There is no particular formula prescribed for the contract involved in making a special deposit or a
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of the deposit in its general business. 2 8 However, where the bank
and depositor enter an agreement, either express or implied, that
29
the deposited funds are to be used for a particular purpose
and that the bank may not use the deposited funds in the general
business of the bank,30 nor mingle the funds with the general
funds of the bank,31 then the deposit is specific. On the other

deposit for a specific purpose. The nature of the deposit is determined
by the mutual intent and understanding of the parties." See Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 93 Cal. App.
2d 75, 208 P.2d 772 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Sherberg v. First Nat'l Bank,
122 Colo. 407, 222 P.2d 782 (1950); In re Warren's Bank, 209 Wis. 121,
244 N.W. 594, (1932). In re Central Trust Co., 68 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1934): "[W~hether a deposit is general or special is to be
determined from the bona fide contract of the parties; that in order to
constitute a special deposit, the facts and circumstances must show that
the bank and the depositor both understood that the fund was to be
held for a special purpose, and that the bank should not pay checks
drawn against it for any other purpose; that if the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the deposit show the same to be
special, the bank receiving the deposit cannot change its character by
wrongfully placing it to the credit of the depositor in his general checking account; but that where the deposit is placed in the general checking
account of the depositor, with his knowledge, and with the right in him
to draw against it for all purposes, it is a general deposit, and title
thereto passes to the bank." Keyes v. Paducha & I.R., 61 F.2d 611 (6th
Cir. 1932); Andrew v. Union Say. Bank and Trust Co., 220 Iowa 712,
263 N.W. 495 (1935); Wenzel v. Peoples State Bank, 270 Mich. 424, 259
N.W. 120 (1935); Borgess Hosp. v. Union Industrial Trust & Say. Bank,
265 Mich. 156, 251 N.W. 363 (1933); Union Properties v. Baldwin Bros.,
141 Ohio St. 303, 47 N.E. 2d 983 (1943).
28 See cases cited in notes 7 and 8 supra.
29 See cases cited in note 27 supra.
30
Wenzel v. People's State Bank, 270 Mich. 424, 259 N.W. 120 (1935);
Borgess Hosp. v. Union Industrial Trust & Sav. Bank, 265 Mich. 156,
251 N.W. 363 (1933). Busher v. Fulton, 128 Ohio St. 485, 489-90, 191
N.E. 752, 754 (1934): "To constitute a special deposit [or specific deposit] the authorities are generally agreed that the depositor and the
bank, at the time the deposit is made, must intend that such deposit
shall remain segregated and not be commingled with the general funds
of the bank, nor used by the bank in accordance with the ordinary
customs and usages of banking practice; and, further, there must be an
agreement, express or implied, that such deposit shall not constitute a
part of the general funds of the bank, subject to its use and control
in the usual and customary course and prosecution of its business."
See Rossman v. Blunt, 104 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1939); In re State Bank, 129
Neb. 506, 262 N.W. 15 (1935); Union Properties v. Baldwin Bros., 141
Ohio St. 303, 47 N.E.2d 983 (1943); 2 PATONs DIGEST, DEPosrrs §§ 9:1,
7D:3 (1942); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 530 (1956).
31 See cases cited note 14 supra.
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hand, if the bank and depositor agree that the bank is merely to
3 2
hold the deposited funds, return the identical funds deposited,
and that the bank may not use the deposited funds in its general
business, nor mingle the funds with the general funds of the
bank,33 then the deposit is special.
A possible difficulty may arise in distinguishing between a
specific deposit and a general deposit for a special purpose. In
both specific deposits and general deposits for a special purpose,
the bank and depositor agree that the bank is to use the deposited funds in a particular manner.3 4 In the former deposit,
however, the bank and depositor also agree that the bank may
not use the deposited funds in its general business,3 5 nor mingle
the funds with the general funds of the bank,36 whereas, in the
latter deposit there is no such agreement and the title to the
deposit passes to the bank creating the relation of debtor and
creditor. 37

B. Glass AND THE LAWS OF SPECIAL AND GENERAL DEPOSITS
In State ex rel. Sorenson v. Bank of Otoe38 and State ex rel.
Sorenson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank" the Supreme Court of
Nebraska stated that the relation between a bank and a depositor of a specific deposit was one of agency. The liability, therefore, of a bank which had misapplied such funds was also based
on agency.
In Bank of Otoe,40 Schultz, a depositor, desired to purchase
a carload of cattle from Bowles Live Stock Commission Company,
and arranged with one Hiulman to borrow $1,200 to pay for the
cattle. The defendant bank was informed by Hillman and Schultz
of the loan arrangement. Hillman gave a check to Schultz for
the amount of the loan, and Schultz deposited the same in his
account in the bank. Schultz then wrote and delivered a check,

32 See

See
34
See
3
5 See
36 See
33

37

See
38125
39125
40 125

cases
cases
cases
cases
cases

cited note 15 supra.
cited note 14 supra.
cited notes 9 and 27 supra.
cited notes 23 and 30 supra.
cited note 14 supra.

cases cited note 9 supra.
Neb. 530, 251 N.W. 111 (1933).
Neb. 800, 252 N.W. 316 (1934).
Neb. 530, 251 N.W. 111 (1933).

State ex rel. Sorenson v. Bank of

Otoe will be hereinafter referred to as Bank of Otoe.
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drawn on his account, in payment of the cattle. Before the check
was honored, but after presentment, the bank became insolvent
and closed. As in Glass, the issue was whether Schultz was a
specific or general depositor. It was held that the deposit was
specific, and that the bank held the deposit as the agent of Schultz.
Upon failure to pay the check, Schultz was entitled to have the claim
treated as a trust fund and allowed preference on the assets of the
bank.
In Farmers& Merchants Bank,41 a depositor sued the defendant
bank claiming a preference on the same theory as Bank of Otoe.
42
The court, citing Bank of Otoe, stated:
We think that the rule, as it exists here and in most of the states,
is that a deposit made for a specific purpose, as for the payment
of a particularly designated claim, partakes of the nature of a special
deposit and is in a distinct class by itself. When a deposit is so
made in a bank, it [the bank] acts as the agent of the depositor,
and if it fails to apply the deposit as directed, or should misapply
it, the deposit may be recovered as a trust fund.
In Glass, however, where the same issue of general or specific
deposit was presented, the court attempted to distinguish Bank of
43
Otoe and Farmers & Merchants Bank by stating:
These cases arose between the depositor and the receiver of
an insolvent bank and the question under the particular circumstances was whether the deposit was a trust deposit, which the
bank was required to separate out and keep separate from the
general funds of the bank. In neither case was the question raised
as to whether the bank could transfer funds from one depositor's
account to another without a written signature or authorizationby
the depositor.
It is contended that this distinction made by the court in
Glass was erroneous.
When the depositor in Bank of Otoe and Farmers & Merchants
Bank entered into the agreement of specific deposit with the
bank, the depositor, at that time, authorized the agent-bank to
apply the deposited funds to a particular purpose. Unless the
depositor and the bank agreed that some subsequent authorization
was needed before the bank could transfer the funds, the bank
could transfer or pay the funds of the depositor at the time agreed

41 125 Neb. 800, 252 N.W. 316 (1934). State ex rel. Sorenson v. Farmers &
Merchants Bank will be hereinafter referred to as Farmers & Merchants
Bank.
42Id. at 802-03, 252 N.W. at 317. (Emphasis added).
43 175 Neb. 673, 681, 122 N.W.2d 882, 887 (1963). (Emphasis added).
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upon by the bank and depositor in the
agreement of deposit for
44
a specific purpose as originally made.
The court in Bank of Otoe and Farmers & Merchants Bank,
after finding that a deposit for a specific purpose existed, merely
imposed the general law of agency to a particular situation where
the agent-bank, because of insolvency, failed to apply the funds
deposited for a specific purpose to the particular purpose intended
45
by the principal-depositor.
In Glass, if, instead of finding a general deposit, the court
had found that a deposit for a specific purpose existed, then the
bank would have been the agent of the depositor for the purpose
of transferring the funds of the principal-depositor's account to
the account of D.46 The authorization of the depositor to the bank
to transfer the funds would have been embodied in the original
47
agreement of specific deposit between the bank and depositor.
If the agent-bank failed to apply the funds deposited to the particular purpose intended, then the bank would have been liable
to the depositor under the general law of agency. However, if the
bank did apply the funds to the purpose intended, then the bank
48
would have incurred no liability.
C.

SPECIAL AND SPECIFIC DEPOSITS-CuRRENT

PRACTICES

Historically, most cases involving issues of special and specific deposits arose in cases involving insolvency of a bank, garnish44

A

depositor makes a deposit for a special purpose in a bank on the condition that the bank will at some particular time, or on the happening
of a particular event, transfer the deposited funds to a third party. Because the bank must apply the deposit for a special purpose in some
particular manner, the authorization of the depositor to the bank to so
apply the deposited funds is embodied in the original agreement of

deposit for a special purpose.
45 See rules of Bank of Otoe and Farmers & Merchants Bank accompanying
4

notes 39-44 supra.

(State ex Tel. Good v. Platte Valley State Bank, 130 Neb. 222, 225, 264
N.W. 421, 423 (1936): "Then there is another class of deposits where
the deposit is made for a specific purpose, as where the fund is delivered
to the bank for a particular, specific purpose. Where a fund is deposited in a bank for purpose of paying a specific obligation, it is
termed a deposit for a specific purpose. In such case, the bank acts as
the agent of the depositor, and if the bank should fail to apply it as
directed, or should misapply it, it may be recovered as a trust deposit."
See State ex rel. Sorenson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 125 Neb. 800,
252 N.W. 316 (1934); State ex rel. Sorenson v. Bank of Otoe, 125 Neb.
530, 251 N.W. 111 (1933).

47

See note 44 supra.

48

See cases cited note 24 supra.
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ment of a deposit, and set-off by a bank of a depositor's funds upon

failure to repay a loan.4 9 The rules and regulations of special and
specific deposits, however, are applicable to all cases presenting
these issues. 50
Modern banks, however, are not equipped to handle special
and specific deposits according to the specifications set down by
the courts.51
Banks can accommodate depositors who wish to make special
deposits by placing the property or money in safe deposit boxes,
or in "safekeeping." This relieves banks from the duty of setting
up a separate deposit apart from the general accounts of the bank,
and separating the property or money deposited from the general
funds of the bank. By placing the deposited funds in a safe deposit boxes the bank utilizes a means they already have to keep and
return the identical money or property deposited.
Specific deposits, however, present a more difficult problem
to the banks because banks usually do not have a similar service

State ex rel. Sorenson v. Bank of Otoe, 125 Neb. 530, 251 N.W. 111 (1933);
State ex tel. Sorenson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 125 Neb. 800, 252
N.W. 316 (1934). These two cases are good examples of a court dealing
with the issues of special and general deposits where a bank has misapplied the deposited funds because of insolvency. The trust fund imposed on the deposit for a special purpose in cases of insolvency is a
constructive trust. State ex rel. Sorenson v. American State Bank, 126
Neb. 34, 252 N.W. 460 (1934); In re Farmers State Bank, 67 S.D. 51, 289
N.W. 75 (1939); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 190 (1936). See also Annot.,
126 A.L.R. 619 (1940); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 462 (1956).
The courts must deal with the issue of general or special deposits
when a bank makes a set-off against a depositor's funds. Engleman v.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 98 Cal. App. 2d 327, 219 P.2d
868 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Sherberg v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Colo. 407,
222 P.2d 782 (1950).
The issue of special or general deposits is important to courts in
cases where a creditor of a depositor is attempting to garnish the depositor's deposit. Dolph v. Cross, 153 Iowa 289, 133 N.W. 669 (1911).
See also 2 PATRON'S DIGEST, Deposits § 9:1 (1942); 5A MxcmE, BANKS AND
BANKING §§ 33, 36 (1950).
50 Caloric Corp. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 205 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1953);
First Nat'l Bank v. Prickett, 19 Ala. App. 204, 95 So. 920 (1923); Green v.
Ashland State Bank, 346 Ill. 174, 178 N.E. 468 (1931); Indiana Southwestern Gas & Util. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Vincennes, 101 Ind.
App. 517, 199 N.E. 871 (1936); Diehl v. Johnson, 123 Neb. 699, 243 N.W.
901 (1932); Citizens State Bank v. Worden, 95 Neb. 53, 144 N.W. 1064
(1914); Morton v. Woolery, 48 N.D. 1132, 189 N.W. 232 (1922).
51
See cases cited notes 27, 30 and 14 supra.
49
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which may be substituted for specific deposits (such as safe deposit boxes substituted for special deposits).
If a depositor wants to set up a specific deposit, the bank
has to set up a separate account for the deposit, and use a completely separate set of books, because a specific deposit cannot be
reflected in the balance sheet of the bank but must be treated as a
trust fund of which the bank is trustee. The deposit would be
expensive for the bank to set up and service; and, the bank could not
offset the expense by investing the deposited funds as banks usually
do with funds of general deposits. Because of these difficulties, and
rarity of specific deposits, it is suggested that banks should handle
specific deposits in one of the following ways:
(1) If a bank has a trust department, it could set up the specific
deposit as a trust deposit with the bank acting as trustee for the
payee-beneficiary. 52 In this case the bank would incur no extra
expense in setting the deposit up, because the trust department
would provide the needed facilities, i.e., separate books, methods
of servicing and governing the account. The bank, as trustee, would
receive trustee's fees for handling the deposit, and the rights and
liabilities of the bank would be the same as any other trustee;
(2) If the bank has no trust department, the bank and depositor could agree to set the deposit up as a general deposit for
a special purpose. The bank could demand subsequent written authorization from both the depositor and payee before applying
the deposited funds to the intended purpose. 53 The relation be54
tween the bank and depositor would be one of debtor-creditor;
the bank would be able to use the deposited funds in the general
business of the bank, and the bank would incur no liability for
subsequently applying the funds on deposit for the special purpose
because of the subsequent written authorization;
(3) If the depositor specifically wants a specific deposit, a
bank could avoid the consequence of the Glass case by drawing a
written contract of deposit for a specific deposit and then complying with the rules and regulations of such a deposit as set down by
the courts. If the bank in Glass had done this they would not have
been liable to the plaintiff for misapplication of deposited funds.
The bank could have proved that the depositor and the bank had

52This is assuming, of course, that the depositor agrees to this method of
handling the deposit.
5 See cases cited note 74.
54 See cases cited note 7 supra.
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set up a deposit for a special purpose and that the bank had applied
the funds to the particular purpose intended.

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AS APPLICABLE TO SPECIAL 5
AND GENERAL DEPOSITS
Signature cards and pass books are usually deemed part of
the contract between the bank and the depositor, and the depositor can not usually vary the terms of the printed material
embodied therein. 6 When a court, however, is presented with an
issue of special or general deposit, the question of whether the
printed material embodied on the signature card and pass book
constitute a final written contract for a special or general deposit is a question of fact to be determined by each individual
court confronted with this problem. 57
In the past, courts have ignored the printed material on signature cards and pass books and have made their determination
on other grounds.5 8 Courts have held that the method of bookkeeping adopted by the bank, 9 the crediting of a deposit in a depositor's pass book as special or general, and the issuing to the
depositor a form of check so marked are not usually determina-

55

Special deposit as referred to in this section also includes specific deposits.
562 PATON'S DiGEST, Deposits § 7A: 2 (1942). See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.
1203 (1920): "By the weight of authority if a depositor accepts and
retains a pass book wherein are printed rules of the bank respecting
the repayment of the deposit he is deemed to acquiesce therein, and
they become a part of the contract between the bank and the depositor."
57 In re Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 77 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934);
Goodspeed v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 46 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
The agreement between a bank and depositor embodied in the printed
material on signature cards and pass books is drawn up by the individual
bank, and therefore it is a question of fact when determining whether
or not this agreement was intended to include special deposits as well
as general deposits.
5
8 Maurello v. Broadway Bank & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 167, 176 At. 391
(Ct. Err. & App. 1953). In this case a depositor had opened an account in
the defendant bank in the usual course of banking business, i.e., signature
card, deposit slip, etc., and the question presented to the court was
whether the deposit was special or general. The court, in holding the
deposit general, ignored the printed material on the signature card and
held that the deposit was general because the plaintiff-depositor had not
presented a "scintilla" of proof that the account was special.
59
5B MicmE, BAN s AND BANKaNG § 328 (1950).
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tive of whether a deposit is general or special.00 Deposit slips
are generally considered mere receipts or memoranda constituting
prima facie evidence that the bank received the sum stated at a
particular time and are subject to explanation or contradiction
by parol evidence. 61 The court in the instant case, however, held
that these items were determinative of the issue.
In re Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 62 a case which was very similar

to the Glass case, the plaintiff entered an oral agreement with
the defendant bank to open a payroll account. One of the questions presented was whether oral evidence could be introduced
to vary and contradict the terms of the written contract of the
parties. To this the court stated: 63
We think the objection to the oral testimony was very properly
overruled. So far as is pointed out, the passbook, deposit slips,
and signature cards did not pretend to recite any agreement between the parties respecting the character of the account. The
passbook was nothing more than a writing in the nature of a
receipt, and as such open to explanation by extrinsic evidence; and
the lack of any special characterization of the account on the deposit slips would have warranted the bank in treating the deposits
as general only in the absence of information that they were in
fact made for a special purpose. The signature cards were designed to serve but a very limited purpose at best; and if the
deposits were special, then the bank could in no wise have changed
their character by carrying the account on its books as a general
one.... And so, since the passbook and other writings having to
do with the account were never intended to contain the full contract of the parties so as to foreclose proof of any agreement not

Franklin Say. &Trust Co. v. Clark, 283 Pa. 212, 218, 129 Atl. 56, 58 (1925):
"Whether a deposit is general or special depends on the facts and circumstances attending its making; but it is certain that the mere use
of the word 'special' placed after the depositor's name will not cause
the deposit to come wthin the definition mentioned above, nor will it
effect an appropriation of the moneys for any particular purpose, so
that it may be said they were set aside for a limited purpose with the
bank's knowledge." See also In re State Bank, 129 Neb. 506, 262 N.W.
15 (1935); 5B MIcHIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 331 (1950).
61 State ex rel. Sorenson v. State Bank, 122 Neb. 582, 240 N,W.925 (1932);
Rosenthal v. Citizens State Bank, 129 Colo. 35, 266 P.2d 767 (1954);
Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 600, 603 (1955): "[A] deposit slip . . . executed
by a bank and delivered to a depositor, is not a written contract in which
all oral negotiations and stipulations are merged, but is merely a receipt
constituting prima facie evidence that the bank received the sum stated
at that time." See also Annot., 97 A.L.R. 875 (1935); 5B MicHIE, BANKS
AND BANKING § 328 (1950); 2 PATON'S DIGEST, Deposits § 7C (1942).
62 77 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
63 Id. at 482.

60
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embodied therein, it follows that the parol evidence rule was not
offended by the introduction of the evidence in question, and that
the objection to it was properly disallowed.
The reason courts have been reluctant to apply the parol evidence rule, as the court did in Glass, is primarily based on the generally accepted presumption that a deposit is presumed general
4
unless evidence can be shown to the contrary.3
The party contending that a deposit is special rather than general, therefore, has
the burden of showing that the deposit was received with the express or clearly implied agreement that it should be kept separate
from the general funds of the bank and that it should remain
intact6 5
If the parol evidence rule could be invoked to bar the prior
and contemporaneous oral agreements between a bank and depositor, then a bank could relieve itself of the special duties imposed by a special deposit by merely introducing evidence such as
signature cards, deposit slips and the method the bank used in
treating the deposit, contending that these instruments constituted
the final written intention of the parties. The parol evidence rule
would be invoked, and unless the depositor could introduce some
subsequent evidence, written or oral, showing the nature of the
deposit, the court would presume the deposit was general. In
other words, the bank could negate the intention and agreement
of the parties by merely handling the special deposit as if it were
general.
In the Glass case, the bank handled the deposit as if it were
general, but, unlike the Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. case, the bank,
not the depositor, was contending that the deposit was special. 60

64McCrory Stores Corp. v. Tunnicliffe, 104 Fla. 683, 140 So. 806 (1932);
Wenzel v. Peoples State Bank, 270 Mich. 424, 427, 259 N.W. 120, 121
(1935): "[Tlhe general rule that the presumption with reference to a
bank deposit is that it is general in the absence of evidence to the contrary." Borgess Hosp. v. Union Industrial Trust & Say. Bank, 265 Mich.
156, 251 N.W. 363 (1933); In re State Bank, 129 Neb. 506, 262 N.W. 15
(1935); State ex Tel. Sorenson v. Citizens Bank, 124 Neb. 575, 247 N.W.
427 (1933); Citizens State Bank v. Worden, 95 Neb. 53, 122 N.W. 1064
(1914); Nichols v. State, 46 Neb. 715, 65 N.W. 774 (1896). See also 5B
MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 328 (1950).
JUR. Banks § 419 (1937); Annot., 86

65 7 Am.

A.L.R. 375 (1933).

66Usually the law of special or general deposits will not change when

it is applied to different parties who are contending the deposit special.
However, in this case the court interpreted the records of the bank as
a written contract of general deposit in order to deny the bank the right
to assert by oral agreements that the deposit was special when they had
handled the deposit as a general deposit.
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It seemst hat the court invoked the parol evidence rule because
the bank, who was contending that the deposit was special, had
dealt with the deposit as if it were general. If the bank had
been allowed to contend and prove that the deposit was special,
'67
then the bank would have been allowed to "reap the rewards
of a general deposit while being relieved of the requirements
of a special deposit.68 To resolve this dilemma the court invoked
the parol evidence rule as a type of estoppel, denying to the bank
the right to contend one thing when in fact they had done another.
It is submitted that if the court had applied the law of special
and general deposits as promulgated in its earlier decisions, and
by other jurisdictions, the same result would have been reached.
The bank would have had to prove that there had been an agreement between the bank and plaintiff that: (1) the deposit was
for a specific purpose,60 and (2) that the bank was not to mingle
70
the funds nor use the deposited funds in its general business.
From the facts stated in the opinion, and the testimony of both
the bank teller and plaintiff, it is apparent that these parties never
entered such an agreement. Thus, if the court had applied the rules
of special and general deposits they would have found the deposit
general.
ORAL AUTHORIZATION OF A DEPOSITOR TO
TRANSFER FUNDS
Judge Spencer, dissenting in the Glass case, 71 pointed out that
the majority opinion ignored the question of whether the bank
was subsequently orally authorized to transfer the funds from the
account of the plaintiff to pay the checks of D. The concurring
opinion by Judge Carter, 72 points out the fact that this matter
was not "raised by the pleadings [on appeal] and consequently it
is not before the court for its determination. 7 3 Whether this is
a proper treatment of the issue is not the subject of this note. But

A bank may use the funds of a general deposit in its general business,
i.e., loans, purchase bonds, etc.
6s See cases cited notes 14 and 23 supra.
69 See cases cited note 27 supra.
70 See cases cited notes 14 and 30 supra.
71 175 Neb. 673, 682, 122 N.W.2d 882, 888 (1963).
72 Id. at 687, 122 N.W.2d at 890 (1963).
73 Id. at 687, 122 N.W.2d 891 (1963).
67
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if it had been raised by proper pleadings, perhaps the court still
reached the proper decision as a matter of public policy.
The majority of courts have held that by virtue of the implied
contract arising from the usage of banking business, a bank is
entitled to demand some written evidence of an order of the depositor to pay out or transfer his deposit, and the bank is not bound
to act upon oral order. However, a bank may waive its right to a
written order and pay out a fund on deposit or transfer the de-4
posit to the name of another on the oral order of the depositor.7
If the bank so elects to waive its right, and the bank accedes to
the depositor's parol directions in regard to the manner in which
his deposit is to be applied, it will incur no liability in so doing,
provided payment is made in accordance with the depositor's direction, and to the person entitled to receive it. 75
If the bank were allowed judgment in this case on the sole
testimony of its teller, it would be possible for a bank to absolve
itself of all liability arising from an improper transfer of a depositor's funds where someone, by telephone, authorized the transfer. If this were the rule then deposits in all banks for whatever
purpose would be in jeopardy. The correct rule should be that if
a bank waives its right to a written order from the depositor, and
acts on an oral order, the bank should be required to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that such oral authorization was in fact
received from the depositor. No such proof was rendered by the
bank in Glass.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that although the court based its decision upon
misplaced applications of law, the result in Glass was, nevertheless,
correct.
Instead of deciding the issue of whether the deposit was special
or general by the accepted methods used in other jurisdictions,

First Nat'l Bank of Mishawaka v. Stapf, 165 Ind. 162, 74 N.E. 987 (1905);
Mathey v. Central Nat'l Bank, 179 Kan. 291, 293 P.2d 1012 (1956);
Sawyer v. National Shawmut Bank, 306 Mass. 313, 28 N.E.2d 455 (1940);
Bank of Illmo v. Sturdivant Bank, 232 Mo. App. 102, 89 S.W.2d 560
(1936); Gibraltar Realty Corp. v. Mount Vernon Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 353,
12 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Ellis v. First Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 565, 48 A. 936
(1901); American Nat'l Bank v. Miles, 18 Tenn. App. 440, 79 S.W.2d 47
(1934).
75 Lind v. Porter, 46 Idaho 50, 266 Pac. 419 (1928); Pierson v. Union Bank
& Trust Co., 181 Ky. 749, 205 S.W. 906 (1918); Blackshaw v. French, 45
74

S.W.2d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
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and by previous Nebraska decisions, the court held that the records
of the bank constituted the final written intention of the parties,
and therefore invoked the parol evidence rule, thus barring the
introduction of the prior oral agreement between the bank and
depositor.
If the oral evidence had been introduced, however, the decision
would probably have been the same. The testimony of the teller
failed to show any agreement between the bank and depositor that
the funds on deposit could not be used by the bank, nor mingled
with the other funds of the bank. In fact, the bank, had insisted
that the deposit was special, and had entered it on their books as a
general deposit. Also, if the deposit was special the bank would
not have had to receive subsequent oral authorization to transfer
the funds. This deposit, then, was merely a general deposit for a
special purpose. And for this reason, the rules of Bank of Otoe
and Farmers & Merchants Bank did not apply.
It seems that the only conclusion which may be drawn from
the decision in Glass is that if a bank, rather than a depositor, is
contending that a deposit is special rather than general, there must
be: (1) a mutual agreement that the deposit is special; (2) the bank
must enter the deposit as special on their records, and; (3) the
banks must treat the deposit in accordance with the rules set forth
for the establishment of special deposits, which includes refraining
from using the deposited funds as their own.
Today situations as presented in Glass involving the issues of
special or general deposits are somewhat unusual, primarily because modern banking practices such as deposits in "safekeeping,"
escrow accounts, trust departments, and the variety of methods in
which a general deposit may be employed have reduced the need
for special and specific deposits. It is submitted, however, that
should a bank be confronted with a situation as presented in Glass,
it may avoid the rule of Glass by handling the deposit in one of
the following ways: (1), earmark the deposit as a trust deposit
with the bank as trustee; (2), set the deposit up as a general deposit
for a special purpose and require some subsequent written authorization from both the depositor and payee before applying the funds
in the particular manner intended, or; (3), draw a written contract
of specific or special deposit and then proceed to handle the deposit in the manner set forth above.
Thomas H. DeLay '65

